Investment Philosophy

Investment philosophy · version 2.0 · prepared 10 July 2026

Assertive when conditions reward risk. Defensive when the cycle becomes fragile.

This is not a promise to predict the next crash. It is a disciplined way to participate in long bull markets without assuming that every late-stage excess will resolve gently.

General advice only. This page contains general information and general financial product advice. It does not take into account your objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on it, consider its appropriateness having regard to your circumstances, and read the relevant disclosure documents. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance. All portfolios shown are hypothetical models, not products you could have invested in, and all figures are before fees, transaction costs and tax.

What 100 years tells us

Growth wins over long periods. The journey is the price.

From 1926 to 2025, shares produced higher returns than bonds or cash, and portfolios holding more shares finished far ahead. That conclusion is unsurprising: investors are normally rewarded for accepting more uncertainty.

The important distinction is between an arithmetic average and a compounded return. An arithmetic average describes the typical year. Compounding describes what actually happened to a dollar through every gain and loss. A 50% fall requires a 100% gain to recover, so volatility pulls the compounded result below the simple average — for shares, by well over a full percentage point per year.

Asset class Average yearly return (arithmetic) Compounded annual return Year-to-year volatility Worst calendar year
Australian shares 11.50% 9.94% 18.5% −40.4% (2008)
US shares (S&P 500, in USD) 12.35% 10.49% 19.5% −43.3% (1931)
Australian bonds 6.12% 5.94% 6.3% −10.1% (1973)
Australian cash 5.68% 5.60% 4.1% 0.0% (2021)

Basis: 100 audited calendar-year returns, 1926–2025, nominal (not adjusted for inflation), income reinvested where the source series is a total-return series. Long-run histories require proxies: Australian data before 1970 comes from academic research series, Australian bonds before 1970 are a yield-based proxy rather than a true total-return index, and US figures are in US dollars with no currency conversion. Every year’s figure, source and status label is in the quant appendix. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance.

Holding more growth assets produced far higher outcomes over the century. Trying to do better than a static portfolio requires the intellectual courage to recognise risks building beneath a strong market — and the humility to accept that those risks may take years to matter.
The three profiles

Different amounts of growth risk, not different beliefs about the future.

All three model portfolios hold the same four asset classes. The difference is how much short-term loss each investor is prepared to tolerate in exchange for higher long-term return.

Defensive

50% growth assets

20% Australian shares · 30% US shares · 47% bonds · 3% cash

100-year compounded return: 8.7% p.a.

$1 grew to roughly $4,100

Worst calendar year: −14.3% (1973)

Balanced

70% growth assets

28% Australian shares · 42% US shares · 27% bonds · 3% cash

100-year compounded return: 9.6% p.a.

$1 grew to roughly $9,300

Worst calendar year: −22.6% (2008)

Growth

85% growth assets

34% Australian shares · 51% US shares · 12% bonds · 3% cash

100-year compounded return: 10.2% p.a.

$1 grew to roughly $15,900

Worst calendar year: −30.6% (2008)

DefensiveBalancedGrowthLog-scaled for readability. Hypothetical models, annual data, rebalanced yearly, before fees and tax.

These are hypothetical model portfolios rebalanced to target weights each year, calculated from the audited annual series described above. No such portfolio existed or could have been invested in over this period; index investing itself only became practical in recent decades. Figures are before fees, transaction costs and tax, with US share returns in US dollars (currency movements between the Australian and US dollar, which were at times very large, are not reflected). Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance.

The philosophy in plain English

Participate first. Protect later.

Early and mid-stage bull markets are usually periods when earnings, liquidity and confidence are still supporting risk-taking. Our default posture is therefore assertive: hold the Growth profile and allow compounding to work.

Late-stage markets are different. Valuations can detach from cash flows, leverage can rise, market breadth can narrow and good news can begin producing less upside. None of those indicators announces a crash date. Together, they may justify accepting less market risk.

The greatest practical danger is moving too early. A defensive portfolio can protect capital during a crash, but it can also miss a powerful final advance. The worst outcome is not simply suffering a drawdown; it is abandoning a sound long-term portfolio for a crash that never arrives.

Early to mid-cycle

Stay assertive

Use the Growth profile while the investment case remains supported. Do not manufacture caution merely because markets have risen.

Late cycle

Reduce risk deliberately

Move toward Defensive only when the agreed evidence accumulates. The live decision may be staged; the historical study below uses a single switch so the arithmetic is understandable.

After the break

Rebuild growth exposure

The historical study returns to Growth three months after the trough. In practice, the committee would require improving liquidity, stabilising credit and functioning markets — not clairvoyance.

Five crash cycles

What being early or late would have cost.

For each of five major US market crashes, we compare the three static profiles against a portfolio that switched from Growth to Defensive 12, 24 or 36 months before the market peak — using peak and trough dates that are only knowable after the event.

Read this before the tables — these results were not achievable.

  • The rows marked Hindsight assume the switch dates were chosen with perfect knowledge of when each crash began and ended. No investor, including us, could have timed these switches. They measure the economics of being early or late, not a result anyone earned or a result we expect to achieve.
  • Dollar figures are from a modelled monthly dataset. Australian monthly returns are spread evenly within each year, US crash-window returns are set to match the reported peak-to-trough price fall, and the headline decline shown for each crash is the fall in the US share market, not in these portfolios. Real month-by-month outcomes would have differed.
  • Each window runs from 60 months before the peak month to 60 months after the trough month, except the Great Depression window, which starts in January 1926 (44 months before the peak) because that is where the dataset begins.
  • All figures are hypothetical, before fees, transaction costs and tax, ignore currency movements, and are rounded to the nearest $100. Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future performance.
Great Depression

September 1929 to July 1932

−86.1%US share market fall
What was buildingA long speculative expansion had been amplified by margin lending and easy access to borrowed money. The Federal Reserve was already trying to restrain speculation as economic activity began to weaken.
What brokeThe October 1929 break destroyed confidence. Banking panics, deflation and policy mistakes then turned a market crash into a prolonged economic depression.
Strategy Starting value Ending value Return
Switch 12 months before peakHindsight — not achievable $100,000 $300,800 +201%
Switch 24 months before peakHindsight — not achievable $100,000 $284,500 +184%
Switch 36 months before peakHindsight — not achievable $100,000 $270,200 +170%
Growth (static) $100,000 $220,400 +120%
Balanced (static) $100,000 $212,900 +113%
Defensive (static) $100,000 $201,700 +102%

Market fall measured on the S&P index and its predecessor (price only, in USD). Context: Federal Reserve History. Calculation and data provenance: quant appendix.

1973–74 bear market

January 1973 to October 1974

−48.2%US share market fall
What was buildingInflation was already persistent, the Bretton Woods currency system had broken down and economic momentum was deteriorating.
What brokeThe oil embargo and sharp rise in energy prices intensified inflation and recession at the same time. Policy had no painless response.
Strategy Starting value Ending value Return
Switch 36 months before peakHindsight — not achievable $100,000 $210,000 +110%
Switch 24 months before peakHindsight — not achievable $100,000 $205,400 +105%
Switch 12 months before peakHindsight — not achievable $100,000 $201,300 +101%
Defensive (static) $100,000 $180,600 +81%
Balanced (static) $100,000 $176,900 +77%
Growth (static) $100,000 $173,800 +74%

Market fall measured on the S&P 500 (price only, in USD). Context: Federal Reserve History. Calculation and data provenance: quant appendix.

Black Monday

August 1987 to December 1987

−33.5%US share market fall
What was buildingEquities had risen quickly, interest rates were rising and market plumbing had not caught up with the growth of index futures, options and automated hedging.
What brokeOn 19 October, portfolio-insurance selling and structural weaknesses accelerated a global one-day collapse. The economy and banking system were not impaired to the same extent as in the longer crashes.
The useful exception. Black Monday was sudden and severe, but the recovery was much quicker than the Great Depression, Dot-com bust or GFC. In this cycle, only a switch close to the peak would have helped, and the 36-month switch gave up so much of the preceding bull market that it finished last — behind all three static portfolios. This is the clearest illustration of the cost of being early.
Strategy Starting value Ending value Return
Switch 12 months before peakHindsight — not achievable $100,000 $524,700 +425%
Switch 24 months before peakHindsight — not achievable $100,000 $494,400 +394%
Growth (static) $100,000 $484,000 +384%
Balanced (static) $100,000 $479,400 +379%
Defensive (static) $100,000 $472,100 +372%
Switch 36 months before peakHindsight — not achievable $100,000 $467,300 +367%

Market fall measured on the S&P 500 (price only, in USD). Context: Federal Reserve History. Calculation and data provenance: quant appendix.

Dot-com bust

March 2000 to October 2002

−49.1%US share market fall
What was buildingTechnology valuations had moved far ahead of realised earnings and cash flows. Participation, issuance and confidence in “new economy” businesses were exceptionally high.
What brokeInvestor expectations reversed as earnings disappointed and financing conditions tightened. Corporate failures, recession and the September 2001 attacks extended the decline.
Strategy Starting value Ending value Return
Switch 12 months before peakHindsight — not achievable $100,000 $413,100 +313%
Switch 24 months before peakHindsight — not achievable $100,000 $399,800 +300%
Switch 36 months before peakHindsight — not achievable $100,000 $387,300 +287%
Growth (static) $100,000 $352,000 +252%
Balanced (static) $100,000 $331,800 +232%
Defensive (static) $100,000 $306,100 +206%

Market fall measured on the S&P 500 (price only, in USD). Context: FRBSF Economic Letter. Calculation and data provenance: quant appendix.

Global financial crisis

October 2007 to March 2009

−56.8%US share market fall
What was buildingHousing leverage, weak mortgage underwriting and opaque securitised credit exposures had accumulated inside the financial system.
What brokeFalling house prices damaged mortgage securities and funding markets. Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and AIG turned credit stress into a systemic crisis and deep recession.
Strategy Starting value Ending value Return
Switch 12 months before peakHindsight — not achievable $100,000 $289,500 +189%
Switch 24 months before peakHindsight — not achievable $100,000 $279,200 +179%
Switch 36 months before peakHindsight — not achievable $100,000 $270,600 +171%
Growth (static) $100,000 $239,900 +140%
Balanced (static) $100,000 $232,800 +133%
Defensive (static) $100,000 $222,900 +123%

Market fall measured on the S&P 500 (price only, in USD). Context: Federal Reserve History. Calculation and data provenance: quant appendix.

How these two datasets relate. The century-scale figures earlier on this page come from the audited annual series, which ties each year to a published source. The crash case studies above come from a modelled monthly dataset built for stress analysis: within each crash window the US series is deliberately set to the full reported price fall, which is deeper than a dividend-inclusive return. That conservative choice means the monthly dataset compounds to lower century-long totals than the annual series (for example, $1 in the Growth model grows to roughly $6,500 on the monthly basis versus roughly $15,900 on the annual basis). It also flatters the hindsight switches: because the modelled crash windows are deeper than dividend-inclusive reality, strategies that step aside look somewhat better than they would on a true total-return path. Both datasets, every override and every formula are published in the quant appendix.
Who can use this approach

The strategy demands more temperament than prediction.

Patience

Late-stage conditions can persist. The investor must tolerate underperformance while a more aggressive portfolio continues rising.

Governance

Triggers, authority, ranges and review dates must be written down. Otherwise “dynamic” becomes a polite word for improvisation.

Humility

The signal may be early, late or wrong. Position changes should be proportionate to the evidence rather than framed as certainty.

Key risks of a dynamic approach: reducing risk too early and missing further gains; acting on false signals; transaction costs and tax triggered by switching; delay between decision and implementation; markets recovering faster than the re-entry rule allows; currency movements on international assets; and abandoning the process under pressure. A dynamic approach can produce worse outcomes than simply holding a static portfolio.

Evidence

Nothing important is hidden.

The separate appendix includes the 100 annual observations, all 1,200 monthly observations, every source and status field, the crash overrides, proxy definitions, calculation notes and downloadable workbooks.

Open the full quant and source appendix →

The Virtuous Licensee Pty Ltd ABN 61 613 521 510, AFSL 526892 · Investment Philosophy v2.0 · Prepared 10 July 2026.

This material contains general information and general financial product advice only. It has been prepared without taking into account your objectives, financial situation or needs. Before acting on any information on this page, you should consider whether it is appropriate for your circumstances and read any relevant disclosure documents, and consider seeking personal financial advice.

All portfolio figures are hypothetical model calculations, not the performance of any real portfolio or product, and are shown before fees, transaction costs and taxes, in nominal terms, with US-dollar returns unconverted. Long-run data relies on proxy series described in the appendix. Past performance — actual or modelled — is not a reliable indicator of future performance.